On atheist blogs you generally see a strong and not
unwarranted attack on climate-change deniers, especially those who “don’t
believe” in any significant anthropogenic
contribution to global warming. 1
The general
criticism (of the deniers) has four common planks:
1.
The climate-change
deniers, though typically not scientists themselves, show utter disregard for
the scientific consensus.
2.
The climate-change
deniers are ideologically motivated, by politics, economics or both.
3.
The “science” of the
climate-change deniers often is not
science at all, but trivial and anecdotal. (Gee
it’s cold out, I could sure use a bit of that global warming! Ha ha!)
4.
The references
provided by climate-change deniers, if any, are often not to scholarly
peer-reviewed literature but to unpublished work of fringe scientists or
popularizations.
I have seen, for
years actually, the exact same pattern of science denialism, often by those making the charges against climate change
deniers.
They are fine-tuning
deniers.
Let me give my
definition of fine-tuning.
Fine-tuning: It is the observation that the ability of the
universe to synthesize heavy elements (heavy = anything beyond Helium, or
“metals” to Astronomers), which are necessary for any kind of life, appears to be sensitive, extremely so in some
cases, to the values of various physical constants. This sensitivity is across
the board: first in the fact that there are any stars at all, then to the range
of lifetimes of the stars, then to the process by which stars synthesize heavy
elements, and finally to process by which some stars end their lives (by
exploding) and thereby seed the universe with those elements.
Here are some facts
about fine-tuning:
·
It has nothing
to do with probability. It has to do with sensitivity.
There is nothing in the definition that relies on any assumption of the a
priori probability of the constants. They could be random draws (extremely low
probability) or unit probability (from some unknown theory of everything). It
only matters that the creation of the elements necessary for life is sensitive
to the values.
·
It is a consensus
viewpoint, especially among “in-field” scientific disciplines, such as cosmology,
astronomy, particle and nuclear physics.
·
It has nothing to
do, per se, with religion or “intelligent design”. Sure, it has been co-opted
by some, and very stupidly by the ID crowd 2 who, without reason
(and ultimately to their disadvantage) hitched their wagon to a “low-probability
therefore god” argument. But ideas can always be co-opted 3, such as evolution and genetics being co-opted
for eugenics. You have to evaluate the scientific idea on its scientific merits,
not on its potential for use by people you don’t like.
·
It is considered a
serious scientific problem/puzzle (and therefore quite interesting) by
scientists of all religious stripes. Some of them quite famous for their
atheism as well as their science, such as Weinberg, Susskind, Krauss, Smolin,
etc.
The fine-tuning
problem is even a very real part of the motivation for a push toward a
multiverse theory of one form or another. It is appealing to solve the problem
by confirming there are many (essentially infinite) universes with different
constants, and only those (such as ours) with a fortuitous draw have
intelligent life pondering their good fortune.
4
This is the state of
affairs. It is irrefutable that many scientists, many of them famous atheist scientists, view the appearance
of fine-tuning as a serious problem, one that should not be summarily dismissed
because of a perceived ideological inconvenience. No, it is a problem that is screaming
for a scientific solution.
Yet If you try to make this point on
atheist blogs (I have tried countless times) some of the same people who legitimately attack climate-change denialism will use the same methods in their fine-tuning
denialism.
1.
They will disregard the scientific
consensus. It suddenly won’t matter that a majority of in-field scientists
think fine-tuning is a serious problem. In fact, pointing out that many
scientists think so will often be “refuted” by charges that one is “arguing from
authority.” But pointing out that most in-field scientists acknowledge global
warming and pointing out that most in-field scientists acknowledge the fine-tuning
problem is not an irrational appeal
to authority.
2.
Like climate-change deniers, many of
the fine-tuning deniers appear to be motivated not by science, but by ideology.
The reasoning, sometimes behind the scenes and sometimes front and center, is “fine-tuning→intelligent design→religion→bad→therefore it must be wrong (at all
costs). It connects the evaluation of science
(the reality of the fine-tuning problem) with something not scientific (it
gives the “bad guys” an advantage)—and that reasoning is always wrong.
3.
Most frustrating to me is that the
“rebuttal” of fine-tuning is often trivial. I cannot count how many times
someone has given me, in gotcha tones,
the Douglas Adams puddle argument, which has no application whatsoever to the
cosmic fine-tuning problem. 5 Another kind of trivial response is the
“how do we know there couldn’t be life with only hydrogen and helium?”
rebuttal. This ignores the fact that you
can’t make anything out of those elements, and that any life, using a
non-controversial assertion, needs large molecules to store information. And,
by the way, the (effectively) “I saw a creature on Star-Trek who was made of pure energy so who knows?” Stated with an
assumption of moral superiority overs us matter chauvinists, is not a
scientific response. Another trivial dismissal of the fine-tuning problem is to
project one’s own disinterest onto the human population at large. This is the
“I just don’t see it as a big deal, we are here and that’s that, just move on”
argument. This implies that scientists should just shut up and listen and not
consider “how is it that we are here?” to be a question of interest. Finally,
some will irrationally attack it because of its name. But “fine-tuning” does
not imply a tuner—it’s used a metaphor. Get over it.
4.
The fine-tuning deniers have their
authorities that they believe should end the argument. First and foremost is
Victor Stenger. Because Stenger (who, to be fair, has a good idea, to show that
the fine-tuning is an illusion) has published a popularization—well that
settles it, doesn’t it? But the fact is that Stenger, in attempting to show fine-tuning
is an illusion, has only done sloppy work, he has not published in peer-reviewed
journals, and you do not find those scientists who consider fine-tuning a
serious problem (like the atheists I mentioned) now saying: “OMG, we were
worried about nothing! Stenger solved it for us!” Because Stenger did nothing
more than a few back-of-the-envelope calculations and then wrote a
popularization in which he claims to have solved a serious problem. He didn’t.
He has a good idea that he has not run with scientifically—he has, instead,
marketed it adroitly. (For a competent takedown of Victor Stenger, read Luke Barnes.)
Alas, Davies also brings up the anthropic principle, that tiresome exercise in metaphysical masturbation that always flounders somewhere in the repellent ditch between narcissism and solipsism. When someone says that life would not exist if the laws of physics were just a little bit different, I have to wonder…how do they know? Just as there are many different combinations of amino acids that can make any particular enzyme, why can't there be many different combinations of physical laws that can yield life?
I'm also always a bit disappointed with the statements of anthropic principle proponents for another reason. If these are the best and only laws that can give rise to intelligent life in the universe, why do they do such a lousy job of it?
Forgetting that, again, it's a metaphor, he is essentially making the irrelevant value statement that: if there is a fine-tuner, why then he is an incompetent dolt. We can ignore that criticism (which is metaphysics, not physics) and point out the obvious. The fine-tuning problem in no way, shape or form says that we are in the best possible universe for intelligent life. It says only that the habitability of our universe is sensitive to the constants,
To summarize I think that, on blogs at
least, there is a massive case of Pot. Kettle. Black. when it comes to science
denialism. You can find many commentators bashing climate-change deniers out of
one side of the mouth while from the other side they spout the same denialist
unscientific tricks when it comes to the cosmic fine-tuning problem.
1 My own position on climate change is this: I am a nuclear physicist. I have no expertise in the field of climate change. So just like any other scientific argument that is out of my field, and for which I have no time or interest to ramp up, I accept the scientific consensus. I have confidence that the checks and balances inherent in science mean that, when you don’t know and can’t evaluate on your own, it’s a good bet to accept the consensus view of in-field scientists. Or stay quiet.
2 From a strategic viewpoint (and from a
theological one) the ID crowd is wrong to adopt a “low-probability implies god”
position. A low probability universe is exactly
what the scientific community argues is to be expected in the multiverse. Any multiverse theory is perfectly happy to acknowledge
that our universe is mind-boggling in its rarity. On the other hand, a “theory of everything”
with no free parameters (which isn’t going to happen, but let’s pretend) would
be on the other end of the
probability spectrum (the constants would have unit probability) and, coupled
with sensitivity to those constants (fine-tuning) would make the best prima facie case for a designer. It
would mean that habitability was built into the fabric of space-time. Short of
God making a personal appearance, there is no better result that theists could
wish for. It always surprises me that the IDers do not see this.
3 I find it useful to point out that ideas can
simultaneously be co-opted and distorted. Thus when genetics is co-opted for eugenics,
or statistics for bell-curve arguments, or Bayes’ theorem to comment on the
existence of a historical Jesus, or fine-tuning for supporting ID, it does not imply that those doing the co-opting
are using the ideas properly. Nor does it imply, in and of itself, that they
aren’t.
4 Susskind was asked
by Amanda Gefter at New Scientist: “If we do not accept
the landscape [multiverse] idea are we stuck with intelligent design?”
Susskind responded (rather clumsily, in my opinion): “I doubt that physicists will see it that way.
If, for some unforeseen reason, the landscape turns out to be inconsistent -
maybe for mathematical reasons, or because it disagrees with observation - I am
pretty sure that physicists will go on searching for natural explanations of
the world. But I have to say that if that happens, as things stand now we will
be in a very awkward position. Without any explanation of nature's fine-tunings
we will be hard pressed to answer the ID critics.” I only bring this
up as an example of scientists using the fine-tuning problem as a motivation,
at least in part, for their multiverse research.
5 The puddle argument (a sentient puddle observing just how perfect the universe (a pot hole) is for its existence, ergo god) is perhaps relevant for privileged planet debates (isn’t our planet just perfect for human life?) but not for cosmic fine-tuning which addresses the very building blocks (heavy elements) for any kind of life.
5 The puddle argument (a sentient puddle observing just how perfect the universe (a pot hole) is for its existence, ergo god) is perhaps relevant for privileged planet debates (isn’t our planet just perfect for human life?) but not for cosmic fine-tuning which addresses the very building blocks (heavy elements) for any kind of life.
Well, I disagree with your analysis in four ways. First, *if* there's consensus among physicists and cosmologists about fine-tuning (something I'm happy to accept for the purposes of argument, but which you just assert without providing much evidence), then the consensus seems to be that it is a scientific problem that needs solving. This is very different from the consensus about anthropogenic global warming, which is *not* that it's a scientific problem that needs solving; it's that it's happening with very high confidence. The big "problem" in AGW is convincing the public and lawmakers that action need to be taken. So I think you've got a false analogy to start with.
ReplyDeleteSecond, I think it is incorrect to claim that "heavy elements ... are necessary for any kind of life" and "any life, using a non-controversial assertion, needs large molecules to store information". Of course, we may end up in an argument about the meaning of "life", but assuming you buy the definition of life as a kind of self-replication, then there's no reason to believe that life needs molecules, as we know them, at all. In various simple computer models, self-replicators are known to be possible (even in Conway's game of life), and these could well exist in universes very different from ours.
Third, I think your conceptual problem lies here: "He doesn't seem to grasp that if the constants are tweaked a bit there will be no elements to produce amino acids or any other molecules necessary for any kind of life." You seem to have in mind a model where *all possible universes* are basically *just like ours*, *except* the fundamental constants have been changed somewhat. But how do you know these are the *only* possibilities? Where in your space of possibilities are models like Conway's? Some physicists seem to have a paucity of imagination, and then they confuse this paucity with a description of all possible universes.
Fourth, I think your rejection of probability as irrelevant is wrong; I think it's absolutely crucial. Maybe life-permitting universes are relatively common, in which case it's not so surprising we are in one. Since *nobody* currently knows how universes are made, nor any good idea of the space of possible universes, we can't say anything currently about those probabilities.